The development of high-tech industrial parks (HTIPs) has become a salient phenomenon in China's economic and urban development. Current studies regarding the development of HTIPs tend to focus either on the active role of the local government or on the consequences of technological innovation that those parks may have brought about. Very few studies have paid attention to the intrinsic relationship between the process of space production in building HTIPs and the effect on urban development. To fill this theoretical gap, this article considers developing HTIPs as a territorial project through which both central and local states seek to promote economic growth by reorganizing their territories so as to facilitate capital accumulation based on building high-tech industrial parks. The authors use Beijing's Zhongguancun and Shanghai's Yangpu areas as examples to show the active role played by district governments in promoting and using the symbol of "high tech" to develop industrial estates. In the end, due to the HTIPs' quick tax-generating potentiality, their construction has given rise to commodity housing and commercial projects which district governments are much more enthusiastic to pursue. The property-led high-tech development projects have paradoxically generated a negative impact on sustainable high-tech development.
Introduction
Over the past two decades, high-tech industrial parks (HTIPs) have increasingly been promoted in various cities in China as growth engines to facilitate regional and urban development as well as to generate technological innovation. Large areas of urban and rural land have been developed and redeveloped to support the dream of becoming high-tech nodes in the global technological production networks. Among them, Beijing's Zhongguancun (ZGC) science park, built in 1988, was the earliest and has been regarded as the most ambitious. It has been viewed as capable not only of attracting a huge amount of foreign investment but also of generating indigenous the literature, this article regards developing HTIPs as a territorial project through which both central and local states seek to promote economic growth by reorganizing the spatial structure so as to facilitate capital accumulation based on high-tech industries.
We use Beijing's ZGC and Shanghai's Yangpu area as examples to show how district governments in both cities have actively promoted the construction of HTIPs and how some have used them as symbols to develop the designated land. In the end, due to the HTIPs' quick taxgenerating potential, their construction has given rise to property-led projects while not replacing high-tech development, which district governments are much more enthusiastic to pursue. The property-led development projects, we argue, may have had unexpectedly negative effects on the promotion of high-tech development, which was especially apparent in the case of Yangpu District. Our research is based mainly on data collected from field trips to both cities. The 
High-Tech Industrial Parks as Territorial Projects
Urban development has experienced a great transformation in the age of globalization. In a world of fast information flows, cities and regions are regarded as more flexible than national governments in adapting to rapidly changing conditions in markets and technology. Technopoles, of which HTIPs are a representative form, have been planned and established in many regions to promote knowledge learning in order to generate both national and regional wealth. Technopoles here are defined as cities or regions that "contain significant institutions of a quasi-public or nonprofit type, such as universities or research institutes, and which are specifically implanted Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review (http://cross-currents.berkeley.edu).
E-Journal No. 1 (December 2011). there in order to help in the generation of new information" (Castells and Hall 1994, 1) . In order to build technopoles, cities or regional governments have to create the conditions necessary for firms to reside, negotiate with multinationals for them to stay, and nurture small venture firms. In other words, an innovation milieu that has a synergistic effect on knowledge creation has to be implanted (Castells and Hall 1994, 9; Camagni 1991) . The development of Silicon Valley has become an embryonic model for the rest of the world to imitate.
To create an innovation milieu is in fact not only a project for spatial reorganization, but also an image-making venture central to market competition for investment. In order to create a new space for innovation, leaders of a city government become entrepreneurs who engage in reorganizing the city's physical space as part of a global campaign to attract both foreign and domestic firms. Thus, technopoles are also projects that involve creative destruction, whereby certain old historical spaces are destroyed and new spaces are created. Harvey (1989) identifies this trend of city and regional competition as urban entrepreneurialism.
According to Harvey (1989) , capitalist accumulation is based on both an immobile configuration of territory and socially constructed institutions that enable capital circulation.
Therefore, each successful round of capital accumulation has to be built upon the existing socially produced infrastructures that facilitate the accelerated circulation of capital through space. Harvey's perspective on the historical and spatial dimensions of capital accumulation are best described by Doreen Massey's (1984) view, which emphasizes the sedimentation of historical layers of a local area. Massey argues that each local area contains not only one form of economic structure; instead, it is a product of long and varied histories. Some forms of organization die away, while others linger on and continue to influence new rounds of development. When viewed from this perspective, "the structure of local economies can be seen as a product of the combination of 'layers' of the successive imposition over years of new rounds of investment, new forms of activity" (Massey 1984, 114) .
Given the increasing scope and scale of globalization, the central and local states' efforts in strengthening their economic competitiveness reflect a multilevel and multiscalar reconfiguration of their territory (Brenner 1999; Jessop 2002 (Brenner 1999; Jessop 2002 ).
For city managers, current urban governance is more oriented toward the provision of a "good business climate," which enables new construction to lure capital into the local territory.
Although there are no clear recipes for success in bringing new investments, city governments are forced to adopt approaches that increase the amount of fixed local infrastructural investments to attract mobile capital. Space reconstruction and image-making programs are undertaken to promote the city's competitiveness. A new growth machine, which especially contains the real estate sector, is formed to promote the city's rejuvenation and reorientation (Logan and Molotch 1987; F. L. Wu 2002; Jessop and Sum 2000) .
To sum up, space is not merely a physical container within which capitalist development unfolds. It involves social and political elements that ultimately shape the ways in which the economy develops. By encountering an increasingly globalized world, the state and local governments and related actors are continually constructing, deconstructing, and reconstructing the historically specific areas through which multiscalar territorialization has proceeded, in order to facilitate capitalist accumulation and innovation (Brenner 1999, 42) . Hsing (2010) further points out the importance of differentiating the physical, organizational, and discursive dimensions of territorialization of capital, and the linkages and gaps among them.
China, in this specific historical era, has focused much on using the HTIP strategy to develop its economy and to enable its technology to catch up with more advanced countries (Ge 1999; F. L. Wu 2002; Zheng 2010 
Beijing's ZGC-China's First Silicon Valley
Beijing's ZGC is described as the most innovative region in China (Segal 2003; Zhou 2005 Zhou , 2008 (Oi 1992 (Oi , 1995 governments had a strong incentive to lease land to developers, because as much as 95 percent of the income generated would return to the pockets of the local government (Zheng 2010, 93) .
This financial decentralization led to the emergence of "local state corporatism" (Oi 1992 (Oi , 1995 , in which local officials routinely manipulated regulations to allow enterprises to receive the maximum tax advantages and pushed local economic development to the point of sometimes even disregarding national objectives (Segal 2003; Zweig 2002) .
The unleashing of the local government's drive for economic development was also related to its creation of economic and technological development zones (ETDZs). Local governments used tax incentives or subsidies to attract foreign capital into the zones to create economic growth. These zones needed to be approved and regulated by the central state (the Ministry of 
ZGC as the City Government's Territorial Project
Unlike HTIPs in other places, such as Taiwan's Hsinchu HTIP, which was originally located in a rural agricultural area that was much easier to clear for development, BEZ was initially located in an established city district. The initial plan of BEZ was to develop one hundred acres in Haidian District to host high-tech enterprises; however, because of the concentration of buildings in this area, only ten acres were able to be developed. Later, this area was extended to the remote countryside of the Haidian District (i.e., Shangdi IT Industrial Zone)
to host manufacturing activities. In the meantime, both the Changping County government and the Fengtai District government were eagerly applying to Beijing city for new ETDZs in their jurisdiction in order to boost their local economies. These two districts were finally included as part of BEZ in 1991, as the Beijing city government and the central state decided to expand the development area of BEZ to host manufacturing activities that were not suited to locations in the inner city.
As BEZ became a symbol of high-tech development that was able to generate economic growth, many other district governments also began to apply to be included. The district governments of Beijing city eagerly applied to become part of the booming high-tech industry after 1999, when BEZ was renamed ZGC, and ZGC therefore continued to expand. Currently, there are ten zones under the ZGC banner, which are located in various unconnected localities square kilometers, of which 131.84 square kilometers were located in the inner city and the remaining 100.68 square kilometers consisted of new land for development mainly located in rural areas (ZGCAO 2008) . These zones, their locations, and their major economic functions are described in Table 1 and Map 1, below. property-led redevelopment is the most common form" (2009, 298) . This property-led redevelopment project, bearing the label ZGC, is best illustrated by the Fengtai District's "headquarter economy project," discussed next.
ZGC as a Form of Representation: Fengtai's Headquarter Economy
The Fengtai Zone was established by the Fengtai District government in 1991 and was included in BEZ in 1994. It is located in the southwest area of Beijing city, where five square kilometers of land is allocated to BEZ. Developing this area into ZGC was mainly motivated by the efforts of the district government in promoting this area's economic development. Owing to its historical legacy, the southwest end of Beijing city was described as one of its poorest areas, just as the popular statement "The East is rich, the West is prestigious, the North is poor, and the 2002, the district government gave up developing manufacturing land, due to the failed attempts in the former stage, and instead stressed the importance of office buildings. At this stage, the district government collaborated with a British company (Daofeng, which was actually a company led by an overseas Chinese) to develop this area into a so-called advanced business park. However, it might have been due to this term having too obvious a connotation of real estate development that it was later changed by the Fengtai District government to "headquarter economy." The business park consisted of over five hundred office buildings, thousands of apartment buildings, a six-star hotel, and other related recreational facilities and shopping centers.
The whole park was obviously a huge property-led project that intended to use the ZGC label to promote local economic development.
The district government worked very closely with the Daofeng Company to clear the land, pave roads, and overcome many related administrative barriers so that that the development of this "headquarter economy" could proceed smoothly. All of the expenses were covered by the district government, and the company devoted very few resources at this stage. Currently, the headquarter economy has attracted many companies, most of which had been
Beijing-based state-owned companies, some of which were big state-owned companies from other provinces, and only a very few of which were multinational corporations (Zheng 2010, 150) . As a result, the originally very small Daofeng Company became a giant real estate developer in the process. 
ZGC as a Contested Space
As has been shown above, HTIPs have been regarded by different levels of the state in China as promoting both local economic development and technological innovation. ZGC in the Haidian District, due to the concentration of R&D institutes and the state's support, achieved a successful increase in high-tech industries, especially in the IT sector, and then the ZGC label was expanded to other districts. Now ZGC has become a real estate label that has sometimes outpaced the value of developing high-technology industries. This is because technology learning and innovation need time to be nurtured, whereas the real estate sector can generate an immediate capital return for both investors and local government.
The booming of the real estate sector, however, has had its downside in terms of the development of technology, because it has pushed up rental costs to a level that has not been conducive to the survival of start-ups or smaller firms in the Haidian area in recent years.
According to our informant, the rental rate in the core area of the Haidian District (the area in front of Tsinghua University) was about 7 dollars per square meter in 2008; by 2010, it had risen to about 12 dollars in the same area. 7 Many smaller start-ups have already moved out of the expensive area in Haidian District and sought cheaper places on the outskirts of the city in order to survive. 8 The booming of the real estate sector in ZGC has in fact created an economy that is favorable to large firms and stifles the spirit of entrepreneurialism that brought ZGC about in the first place.
Shanghai's Yangpu: Transformation of the Old Industrial Space
Shanghai demonstrates a counterpoint to Beijing's ZGC. 
Yangpu as a Fresh Model of Space Reproduction
The start of the new Yangpu project began with the release of the "Guideline of the Yangpu Knowledge Innovation District" document in 2004. In this guideline, the Shanghai metropolitan administration reconfirmed its policy to integrate three development elements into this district: university campuses, high-tech parks, and local communities. It was dubbed the "triparty cooperation." 9 After less than a decade of development, the new project of rejuvenating Yangpu did not stop at "breeding" or "building" a high-tech center. It had a much more comprehensive goal of urban redevelopment and space utilization. The master design could be realized by Yangpu's project of establishing the developmental framework of "one center, one city, one river, three quarters." According to the design, "one center" refers to the suburban center of the Wujiaochang-Jiangwan area; "one city" refers to the new Jiangwan Township; "one river" refers to the creative and cultural center on the north bank of Huangpu River; and "three quarters" refers to the Fudan-Tongji University science zone, Dalian-Kongjiang Road's modern service zone, and the modern textile industry clusters along the Huangpu River. The urban renovation project was implemented by branding the old area with a knowledge-based economy.
As demonstrated in the example of ZGC, the Yangpu case also provided proof of the active 100 billion yuan (Wan 2004, 94 
The District Government and Real Estate Market
The Yangpu District government itself also controls several real estate-related each university has its own research specialties and concentrations. The land coverage of university campuses in Yangpu has expanded from 4.2 square kilometers to 6.54 square kilometers. Fudan has expanded from 1,600 acres to 4,000 acres, and Tongji has expanded from 1,500 to 2,500 acres. The Yangpu District government has shares of stock in most of the university-affiliated scientific parks. Our interviews show that in the case of Fudan Scientific Park, the district government relocated the existing residents and sold the land to Fudan at very low price. Due to the recent booming of the Wujiaochang area, the market price of the real estate of Fudan Scientific Park has been soaring. Source: Revised from Wang (2008, 148) .
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The district government has also actively renovated the area surrounding Wujiaochang, and has promoted and named it as the Knowledge and Innovation Community (KIC). Wujiaochang, In brief, the northern Yangpu area, with KIC as its core, has gradually been transferred into a multifunctional business district. The "scientific park" is embedded within a reconstructed auxiliary urban center. In addition to the Wujiaochang-Fudan area, the Yangpu District administration has also signed agreements with Tongji University to promote the "Tongji Knowledge Economic Circle." Located in the south of the Wujiaochang District, the focus of such a new initiative is to promote new service clusters, such as architecture, environmental protection, machinery, and other related business pertinent to Tongji's specialties (Leng and Wang, forthcoming) . 
Discussion and Conclusion
This article regards developing an HTIP as a territorial project through which both central and local states seek to promote economic growth by reorganizing the spatial structure in their territories so as to facilitate capital accumulation. In this territorialization process, the central state, the municipal government, and especially the district government have played important roles in reshaping the landscape of each city for the purpose of economic upgrading. Differing from other property-led development projects in China, this HTIP plan has involved not only local states and developers but also universities and R&D institutes. These actors have collaborated to develop the territories in the name of high-tech development and knowledge innovation. Thus, the planned areas, regardless of whether they are agricultural or established urban settlements, have had to be reshaped for hosting foreign and domestic firms or for office buildings. Through this process, territorial places have been transformed into globalized spaces where capital is able to move more freely to engage in manufacturing and commercial activities.
In both the cases of Beijing and Shanghai, we have seen how historical sediments affected territorial development in time (Massey 1984 ). Beijing's Haidian District was home to China's most prestigious universities and R&D institutes, enabling it to become the core innovative area of ZGC at the earlier and later stages of development. Nevertheless, due to its city center status, which limited its manufacturing activities, many district governments in
Beijing later had the opportunity to establish and use the label of ZGC to boost local economies.
Thus, by observing the success of the Haidian District in promoting economic growth through HTIPs, the Fengtai and other district governments in Beijing followed suit to uphold the HTIP in affiliating it with the label ZGC.
In contrast to Beijing's case, Shanghai's Yangpu District, where the most prestigious universities in Shanghai resided, was almost totally ignored by the municipal government in its ambitious Pudong plan in the 1990s. It was the Yangpu District government that observed the success of ZGC and tried to utilize the banner of HTIP to collaborate closely with those universities to regenerate its local economy. Innovation centers and high-tech parks have thus become symbols for district governments to promote the construction of office buildings and lure commercial activities into the area. In the process, the real estate sector, along with the construction of HTIPs, has brought about the growth of the local economy. The Yangpu District government's efforts, however, seem to have had a greater effect on real estate than they did on the so-called knowledge-based economy. (Zhou 2005 (Zhou , 2008 , its followers have not necessarily been able to achieve the same level of technological development.
For example, in 2007, the revenues of the semiconductor chip design and software industries in ZGC contributed about one third of the income of these two sectors in China (ZGCAO 2008, 13-14) ; In addition, in the past five years, ZGC owned over 20 percent of the granted patents in the whole country; in which, Haidian District alone contributed almost 61 percent of this portion. 17 Indeed, compared to ZGC's excellent performance, the Yangpu case is simply an example of a district government intending to develop the local economy by using the HTIP label. Until recently, the development of the real estate sector has been much more successful than that of technological innovation. Most of the technological development in Shanghai continues to be concentrated in Zhangjiang as opposed to in Yangpu, in which Wujiaochang KIC has looked more like a property-led project than a real innovation center.
Currently, the HTIP label is an attractive commodity and a label that can be sold. An interesting development in China now is that the ZGC label has been extended beyond the territory of Beijing city. Currently, the ZGC administrative office is working with the Hebei and Liaoning provincial and Tianjin city governments to create more ZGC zones in those places in order to generate economic value based on the label and to enhance technological development in those places. 18 ZGC as China's Silicon Valley has now become a symbol in campaigning for economic development all over the country. Shanghai's district governments have also established affiliated HTIPs in other provinces to promote economic development. The HTIP label has become a fictive commodity that can be sold and extended to the rest of China to lure district governments to join the high-tech-led development game.
However, there are dim sides to the dazzling HTIP phenomenon. First, the booming of the real estate market has created an environment in which it is difficult for small-and mediumsized enterprises to survive. This is because the district governments have been more interested in luring multinational corporations' or big companies' headquarters to inhabit the zones, and the rents and prices of the land have been escalating so that small venture firms have been forced to (Zhou 2008, Leng and Wang, forthcoming) . Second, the resettlement of the inhabitants in the planned areas has often created resentment on the part of the local population towards the zones because the district governments' compensation fees were too low for local people to survive. As shown in the Fengtai case, many local people are still living in slums where the land was planned but has not yet been developed.
Indeed, HTIPs have become a branding competition. However, as we have shown, this branding game has been favorable to the property-led development of urbanization. As long as the branding of the HTIP, regardless of whether it is ZGC or the headquarter economy, can effectively generate successful economic growth for the local economy, space will be produced and reorganized along with the property-led development approach in China in the foreseeable future. 
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